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In Praise of the Treatise Writer: Law's Special
Knowledge
Ellen M. Bublick*
A few months after I began my academic career, Chief Judge
Richard Posner, in a speech delivered at my new academic home,
asked the question: What is the real knowledge that law has? So, I was
very fortunate to think about the knowledge that law has at precisely
the same moment that I was asking myself : What is the real knowl-
edge that I have? Even compared to Judge Posner's low appraisal of
the law's knowledge,' my own self-estimation was worse, and a path
toward acquiring some valuable erudition only began to appear as I
taught my first torts course.
The casebook I used (then as now) is Dan Dobbs and Paul Hay-
den's Torts and Compensation Systems.' Dobbs, the author of the
foremost treatise on tort law,3 and Hayden, the author of a number of
thought provoking articles,4 have written a book with a clear struc-
ture--one that carefully and methodically elucidates the doctrinal
framework of state tort law. The book also addresses problems in tort
theory and practice and outlines major supplements and alternatives to
existing tort remedies.
For many years, the idea that tort law had an articulable doctrinal
structure would have been news to me. In my own legal education,
my torts professor took a more theoretical view, never suggesting that
negligence law had some formal internal structure, let alone that it
might be useful in any particular way. In fact, I had not learned that
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1. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 12 ("The root of the problem is that law is
still striving to build a body of real knowledge of the kind that has enabled the other professions
that I have discussed to move decisively in the direction of genuine professionalism.").
2. DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY (4th ed. 2001).
3. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS (2000).
4. See, e.g., Paul T. Hayden, Butterfield Rides Again: Plaintiffs Negligence as Superceding or
Sole Proximate Cause in Systems of Pure Comparative Responsibility, 33 LOY. L. REV. 887 (2000).
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negligence had five elements-cduty, breach, actual harm, actual cause,
and proximate cause-until I opened a study guide shortly before my
final exam.
Imagine my surprise then, when teaching tort law through a doc-
trinal framework, I found that I understood not only tort doctrine, but
also tort theory better than I had before. Granted, I had a few advan-
tages the second time around: it was my second time around, I was
learning the materials as a professor rather than as a student, and I had
several years of legal practice behind me. Still, for me, the difference
in the substantive orientation of the materials also had an impact.
Though I no doubt benefited from the repeated comparisons and
contrasts between strict liability and negligence in my own legal edu-
cation and am still awed by the historical richness of that course, theo-
retical comparisons of negligence and strict liability only go so far.
For me, the limitations of those comparisons stem from that debate's
lack of contextual cues,' its alienation from the contemporary culture
in which political debates are as likely to be about negligence and
something less as they are about negligence and something more,6 and
its failure to seriously consider tort law's non-legal competitors for the
resolution of injury related problems.'
If "predictions of what the courts will do is really all there is to
law,"' and what courts do is self grounding, 9 then what could be more
helpful to a student of law than to read materials prepared by ingen-
ious authors who are exhaustively versed in the intricacies of what
courts and legislatures are actually doing in current disputes (as Dobbs
and Hayden undoubtedly are)?
S. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Micro-
analysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996) (describing a synthesis of legal discourse
around more contextual analysis).
6. See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001-003 (2000) (dividing defen-
dants' liability into mutually exclusive responsibility shares as a part of "tort reform").
7. See STEPHEN SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989); Pos-
ner, supra note 1 (asserting that Holmes' The Path of the Law "implies that law as Holmes knew
it, and as we largely know it still, is merely a stage in human history").
8. Id. at 14 (articulating Holmes' argument from The Path of the Law).
9. See Stanley Fish, Meeting at the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 6, 2000):
[T]he first true proposition is that our convictions and practices can not be grounded
in something independent of them, the second and false proposition is that therefore
our convictions and practices are ungrounded.., in fact our convictions and practices
come equipped with their own grounds, grounds that have emerged in the course of
the material history of a task's performance-a history complete with authoritative
pronouncements, sacred texts, exemplary achievements, know patterns of reward,
punishment, advancement, success, failure and so on.
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It was once said of Monet that he "is only an eye, but my God
what an eye!"'" That critique, which was never a fair appraisal of
Monet's immense creativity," is sometimes the view that even admir-
ers take of treatise writers: helpful but only descriptive.
But the term "descriptive" does not begin to account for the
value of the casebook that Dobbs and Hayden have produced, which
although it is not a treatise, undoubtedly benefits from the authors'
extensive treatise related knowledge. Words like "comprehensive"
and "current," while invariably true, need to be matched with other
terms like "insightful" and "provocative." Let me first speak to the
contribution that the Dobbs and Hayden book makes to teachers and
then to its direct value to students.
In an earlier version of the Seattle University Law Review's case-
book series, it was noted that a casebook not only teaches students, it
teaches teachers.' As a teacher who is a student, let me say that
Dobbs and Hayden's book, with its one thousand page teacher's man-
ual and exhaustive yearly update letter, is unparalleled in the support
that it provides to teachers. Dobbs and Hayden's teacher's manual
provides an outline of the materials in the book, brief summaries of
the cases, ideas for discussion, and sometimes materials and thoughts
about every single question presented in the casebook (which amelio-
rated my fear that I might have had to say "I don't know" to every
substantive tort law question that my students asked in my initial year
of teaching). To assist professors with syllabus preparation, the
teacher's manual notes cases or even whole sections that might be
skipped if coverage time is tight, as well as cases that must be skipped
if prior ones are not covered. For example, if you don't teach the sec-
tion 1983 cause of action, you might want to skip the DeShaney case 13
when you come to the nonfeasance section.
Since Torts was the first course that I ever taught from a case-
book (I had previously taught a course in genetics and the law when all
such course materials were homemade), I took for granted that case-
books came with such elaborate user's guides. It was not until I was
asked to teach a new course only a few days before the term began that
I realized to my shock and dismay that the garden variety teacher's
10. This quotation is attributed to Cezanne. MAURICE RAYNAL, CEZANNE 37 (1959); see
also Royal Academy of Arts, London, England, at http://www.royalacademy.org.uk/ex-ingres-
08.htm.
11. PAUL H TUCKER, MONET IN THE 90S (1990).
12. Daniel B. Bogart, A Casebook for Teaching Teachers: Jesse Dukeminier and James E.
Krier, Property, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 921, 923 (1999) ("the single most important tool for
teaching law professors is the casebook").
13. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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manual not only skips the hand holding that Dobbs and Hayden pro-
vide, but also foregoes any pretense of shared ideas between author
and user.
Now that I have read the teacher's manual once from cover to
cover, I must admit that I rarely look back at it. But who needs to?
The casebook cites law review articles on nearly every class topic.
Dobbs' new hornbook, which is the most exhaustive and thoughtful
treatise on the subject, parallels the casebook materials.14 After that, if
you still have questions, Dobbs himself is willing to answer them
(though he may kill me for telling you this if he gets one hundred
emails next week).
For students, Dobbs and Hayden's book is both comprehensive
and current. It not only covers what is sometimes imagined to be the
core of the torts course-negligently caused physical harms -but
also includes critical issues often marginalized as non-core matters,
such as, cases concerning dignitary harms, relational and nonphysical
interests, and damages.16 Indeed, far from ordaining negligence as the
sole concern of tort law, Dobbs and Hayden include injury related is-
sues beyond even the intentional negligence and strict liability frame-
work of tort law. The book includes chapters on tort alternatives such
as workers compensation, social security disability, and no-fault insur-
ance-all of which provide a useful backdrop against which to test the
claim that some form of tort law ought to occupy the central role of an
injury prevention, compensation, or remediation program. Addition-
ally, the book addresses key practical issues like apportionment of
damages, which are as important as the "substantive" tort rules them-
selves once joint and several liability has been abolished and nonparty
defendants have been included.'7
This comprehensive number of subject areas is covered through
interesting, thoughtfully selected, carefully organized, and tightly ed-
ited cases and readings. This tight editing allows readers to see pat-
terns across a broad number of varied cases and has coaxed me away
14. DOBBS, supra note 3.
15. Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1226 n.1 (2001) (describ-
ing an orthodox but controversial understanding of tort law which treats the problem of acciden-
tal injury as "the core of tort law").
16. See Martha Chamallas, Vanished from the First Year: Lost Torts and Deep Structures in
Tort Law 106 (lamenting the loss of discussion of relational and nonphysical interests from Torts
courses), in J.M. BALKIN & SANFORD LEVINSON, LEGAL CANONS (2000).
17. See, e.g., Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2001) (murder vic-
tim's recovery from negligent county, which failed to protect victim from rapists who had threat-
ened to kill her, would have been reduced by 85% if apportionment between defendants' inten-
tional and negligent fault had been permitted).
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from a three-case-a-day habit to a stronger analytical organization of
the day's materials.
The cases are current. Topics covered include cases on fear of
cancer, HIV blood contamination, medical malpractice reform, and
elder abuse. A brief review of the Fourth Edition's new section on the
Third Restatement of Products Liability reveals that the liability of am-
munition and cigarette manufacturers is also included in that edition.
Dobbs and Hayden's yearly update letter, which includes short notes
on hundreds of new cases, suggests further contemporary tort topics.
For example, traditional actions such as trespass to chattels can be
taught in the context of the computer cases that Dobbs and Hayden
cite-a somewhat more interesting application of the doctrine for stu-
dents.'8
Additionally, the casebook covers, and is sensitive to, issues of
race, ethnicity, and gender. Duty-to-warn materials include questions
about duties to provide Spanish language warnings when companies
advertise in Spanish. The loss of consortium section raises the ques-
tion of claims brought by unmarried cohabitants. In addition, the
harms section includes prenatal injuries.
In my view, the comprehensive and current coverage is not an
indulgent luxury, but central to the academic enterprise of engaging
students in analysis.' 9 Still, the Dobbs and Hayden casebook does not
sacrifice other pedagogical objectives in order to achieve these ends (a
feat which seems only possible because of the sheer volume of cases
the authors have read).
Throughout this coverage, insights abound. For example, the
Dobbs and Hayden book structures the negligence section around the
assumption that people generally owe a duty of reasonable care for the
safety of others, and then circles back to cover special categories of
cases in which defendants may be under no duty or limited duties of
care-a structure that establishes the basic rule before the exceptions
and that foreshadows a similar approach taken by the draft Restate-
ment Third of Torts: General Principles.2"
Within that framework, cases are thoughtfully selected and ar-
ranged. For example, the risk-utility materials in the breach section
include a case that implicitly looks at the BPL factors under Hand's
18. See, e.g., Letter from Dan B. Dobbs & Paul T. Hayden to Teachers, at 1 (1998) (citing
CompuServ Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997)).
19. Craig Anthony Arnold, How Do Law Students Really Learn? Problem Solving, Modern
Pragmatism, and Property Law, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 891, 894-896 (1999) (discussing evi-
dence that students "must engage with and use the material[s]" in order to learn).
20. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES, DISCUSSION DRAFT (Apr. 5,
1999).
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test without any such labels, and then includes Carol Towing with
notes about Judge Posner's theory of the economic meaning of negli-
gence-a treatment that reveals less-structured and more-structured
approaches to cost-benefit balancing. 21 The actual harm section first
establishes "but for" causation. Then provides variations on the char-
acterization of the harm that is actually caused, for example, loss of life
versus lost chance of recovery, revealing the vital relationship between
actual cause and both the negligence and actual harm elements.22
With respect to proximate cause, the casebook includes a set of appli-
cation cases that reveal how difficult the formal type of harm and ex-
tent of harm classification task really is in proximate cause analysis.23
These application cases highlight the importance of levels of generality
in tort law.24
Special mention should be made of the case notes, which are
clear, direct, and packed with helpful information. In case after case,
the note questions raise critical issues in both a contextual and broader
frame. For example, one note asks the reader to consider whether the
transferred intent doctrine is sound when the defendant, although act-
ing intentionally with respect to one party, was merely negligent to-
ward the plaintiff? Other notes ask whether there is any justification
for holding a company liable to its workers under workers' compensa-
tion, but not liable to third parties under general tort rules (as when
the company is not at fault)? What is fault? Is a fault based rule just
or socially desirable? How does intent differ from negligence? When
I prepared my first course with the Dobbs and Hayden book, I was
both humbled and reassured to find that nearly every brilliant ques-
tion I could think of for class discussion had already been included in
some portion of the case notes.
Even a book with all of these strengths reveals a few spots that
might be improved.2" In some places, I would like to see more varied
textual support for developing the practical and theoretical answers to
the provocative questions that the text raises. Taking an ecumenical
approach, Dobbs and Hayden cite an innumerable number of articles,
but do not develop many of these beyond case notes. When students
and teachers look at provisional answers to questions about the justice,
21. DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 133-142 (3d ed. 1997).
22. Id. at 180-202.
23. Id. at 218-222.
24. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990).
25. Students sometimes criticize punctuation problems that a careful proofreader at the
publishing house could easily resolve.
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desirability, or (for law and economics folks) optimality of given legal
rules, professors may want to add many of their own supporting texts,
whether broader philosophical readings on the appropriate frame of
tort law, more context-specific studies of the policy effects of legal li-
ability in particular areas, or even fuller versions of the case law.
Still, I cannot get too concerned about this weakness. After all
the hand holding and help the casebook and supporting materials give
teachers, developing some supplementary materials seems like an ap-
propriate vehicle for individual professors to express their own style
and interests using the exhaustive citations in the book as a guide.
Each year, I do develop supplementary materials followed always
by resolutions to change my plan the following year. (After I read the
contributions to this symposium , I am quite sure that I will make new
changes once again.) For now, I try to talk about how tort law moves
in a cultural context.26 So, for example, I have had students read an
excerpt about stock stories27 and identify some of the stock tort stories
that illuminate and limit comprehension.2" We talk about common
understandings of the McDonald's coffee case" as well as available
data on the prevalence of tort litigation.3" To facilitate cross-cultural
comparison, I have given students testimony from a tort case before
the Crow Nation that examines the value of a deceased tribal mem-
ber's life.3 In addition, I have worked with a student from the Nakota
to compare a standard state tort law approach to compensation for a
particular injury with the more relational response of the Nakota to
that same injury.I also try to help students analyze questions about desirable rules
in a small number of concrete settings with more context specific in-
formation. I generally use examples in my own areas of scholarship,
26. Marshall S. Shapo, Millennial Torts, 33 GA. L. REV. 1021 (1999) (discussing tort law as
a social synthesis).
27. Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1985).
28. See, e.g., David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Inju-
ries in an American Community, 18 LAW & SOCY REV. 551 (1984) (examining the myth of liti-
giousness in one county and the cultural tensions underlying it).
29. Halowaty v. McDonalds Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (D. Minn. 1998).
30. These assumption challenging materials were generously shared by Professor Richard
Wright at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
31. The documents include an affidavit prepared by the railroad defendant's accountant
and the deposition testimony from the plaintiffs tribal expert. See February 22, 1996 Affidavit
of Louis L. Wilde, Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (Nos.
98-35502, 98-35539, 98-35541), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1110 (2000); February 2, 1996 Deposition
Testimony of Janine Pease Prettyontop at 191-225, Red Wolf (Nos. 98-35502, 98-35539, 98-
35541). The jury verdict in the case for $250 million dollars was disregarded by United States
federal courts. Red Wolf enjoined execution or enforcement of judgment awarded in personal
injury action brought by heirs of Crow tribal members whose car was struck by a train on the
reservation.
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where I am more likely to be a competent guide.32 But at times, I have
used current national or local problems to frame these questions. For
example, on the national level, we have addressed problems surround-
ing gun injuries.3 On the local level, we have discussed the liability of
state actors to a Tucson girl who was mauled by a bear. 34 When pos-
sible, I try to let students select topics that interest them as a group to
elicit more active engagement, 3S and to introduce them to tangible as-
pects of tort practice like courtroom testimony and expert assistance.
One year, I introduced Coase when we talked about necessity, 36
Jarvis-Thomson when we talked about actual cause,37 and Fletcher
when we made our transition from negligence to strict liability. 3 A
very helpful reader includes these readings and many others.39 In sev-
eral different years, my students were introduced to concepts sur-
rounding the interpretation of Arizona's unique Constitutional Torts
Provisions by a respected and generous Arizona Supreme Court Jus-
tice.
I admit these sorts of supplementation are relatively easy for me
because I have the luxury of a sixth hour of "Torts Lab"-a first-year
legal writing and analysis tag-on to the basic torts class. Were I to
have fewer hours, I think I would (after extensive pleas to the Dean
and faculty for more time) take a similar approach. I would try to help
my students develop a fuller understanding of tort law including the
subtle contours of rules, and the culture, context, and theory that
shape them, and the alternatives that supplement and rival their exis-
tence.
CONCLUSION
If in the end, Judge Posner is right that courts and others should
do a grand BPL to resolve tort rules, and the man of the future is, fol-
lowing Holmes, the man of statistics and economics, then perhaps law
32. Here, I have assigned Ken Simon's insightful work, Assumption of Risk and Consent in
the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1987).
33. See Fox Butterfield, Guns: The Law as Selling Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2000, at 4
(reporting straw purchases made at a gun store whose gun sales were used in at least fifty homi-
cides and 901 violent crimes).
34. See Briefs and February 1, 1999 Court Order, Knochel v. Arizona (Super. Ct., Mari-
copa Cy. 1999) (No. CV 98-09396).
35. Cf. The True, the Good, and the Beautiful: An Interview with Howard Gardner, Across
the Board (1999) (discussing the Reggio Emilia schools in Italy which "start out with whatever
happens to capture the fancy of the young children when school begins").
36. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
37. Judith Jarvis-Thomson, Remarks on Causation and Liability, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101
(1984).
38. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
39. SAUL LEVMORE, FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (1994).
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professors and students should leave law now for other disciplines
with a more sizable claim to the knowledge pie (though which disci-
plines those are remains debatable). Alternatively, perhaps there is a
way that the study of law can become permeable to knowledge claims
from economics, statistics, psychology, anthropology, public health,
and others without being empty handed when approaching the knowl-
edge store. For all of her openness about the substantive content of
any legal rule, the lawyer knows how to take theory and data back to a
human problem and get legal mechanisms to act. This might seem to
be a fairly modest knowledge claim. But in a country in which mil-
lions of grievances are resolved with accompanying court proce-
dures-in matters ranging from petty theft to the Presidency-that
knowledge claim need not be insignificant.4" In the future we may
deal with injuries through insurance and other non-legal mechanisms,
and perhaps rightly so.41 But from my view at the geographic border,
until that transformation occurs, legal bilingualism must prevail.
If I had a single dime (okay 50¢) to call one person on the planet
who could tell me how U.S. tort law with its fifty-fingered hands
would act in a given factual scenario, I would spend my money on a
phone call to Dan B. Dobbs. The law with its big coercive machinery
functions through action or inaction. Dobbs and Hayden, through
their exhaustive and careful review of existing cases and articles, un-
derstand what courts will do in actual cases. I cannot think of a more
helpful place for law students or law scholars to begin the analysis.4"
40. DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND
THE STATISTICS (1987) (studying the amount of tort litigation in the United States).
41. Posner, supra note 1, at 14 (suggesting that "if the law submitted to instruction by eco-
nomics and the other social sciences, we might find the tort system replaced by a system of social
insurance, and the system of the criminal law"). Though our criminal law colleagues' search for
consequences other than the extremes of prison and death, see, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influ-
ence, Social Meaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 359 (1997), suggests that the tort sys-
tem, with its broader range of possible sanctions, may long continue to play a useful role, and
that the question might equally be inverted to ask whether, if the law submitted to instruction by
social sciences and economics, we might find the criminal law system replaced by the tort law in
some number of cases.
42. Cf. Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 933
(2001) ("I do believe that it may be quite useful to go from practice to principles, rather than the
other way round.").
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